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Tax smoothing minimises the economic costs of raising taxes to finance a
varying profile of expenditure.  This standard result assumes that
expenditure pressures do not vary with the short term fiscal position.  In
the presence of expenditure creep, however, tax smoothing is no longer
optimal tax policy.Introduction
A basic result in fiscal theory is that the economic costs of raising taxes, to
finance a varying profile of expenditure, are minimised by striking an average
tax rate over the period.  This is the “tax smoothing” result.
In New Zealand and many other countries, demographic changes are set to
push up Government expenditure (in particular on superannuation) over time.
Both inter-generational and tax smoothing arguments can be advanced in
favour of setting taxes so as to achieve an initial (and lengthy) period of budget
surpluses, followed by a period of deficits as expenditure rises.
The tax smoothing argument would be undermined, however, if the period of
surpluses were to trigger higher expenditure than would otherwise be the case
– “expenditure creep” in other words.  This short paper addresses the issue at a
theoretical level.  Does the basic tax-smoothing result hold when expenditure is
not exogenous?
For purposes of comparison, I also look at the effect on the results of
expenditure control, in the shape of an exogenous reduction in expenditure from
its originally-projected level.
The basic model
We set up a simple two-period fiscal model for this purpose.  The two periods
can be viewed as the short term and the longer term.  GDP is fixed at Y in each
period.  The interest/discount rate from period 1 to period 2 is r.  There is no
initial debt.  Expenditure is fixed at G1 in period 1.
Expenditure in period 2 is G2 which can vary in response to the fiscal situation
in period 1, or in response to active expenditure control (more on these later).  If
the period 1 budget is balanced, and without additional expenditure control,
then period 2 expenditure is G 2 .  We are interested in the situation where
GG 21 > .
Tax rates are t1 and t2.  We also define “balanced budget” tax rates by
tG Y tG Y 11 2 2 ==   and   .  At these tax rates the budget would be balanced in
each period.
















In what follows it will be convenient to isolate the effect on the budget constraint
of the difference, if any, between G2 and G 2 , or equivalently between GY 2
and t 2 .


























(B) is a standard quadratic loss function.  Any other concave function will
generate the same results in qualitative terms.
Note that this formulation does not take account of any marginal costs or
benefits from variations in period 2 expenditure away from G 2 .
Exogenous expenditure











To minimise the costs of taxation, we form a Lagrangian from (B) and (C) and
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Hence t1 = t2  - the basic tax-smoothing result.
Endogenous expenditure
We now let second-period expenditure vary with the size of the first-period
surplus, or, equivalently, with the difference between the first-period tax rate
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   for some positive elasticity 3
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This implies that the optimal tax setting is no longer t1 = t2, but:
() tt 12 1 =- ¢ e
-  ie lower taxes in the first period than the second.
Expenditure control
In this model we can represent the effects of expenditure control by an
exogenous reduction in the level of second period expenditure.  This will affect
the required tax rates but not the qualitative results derived above.
A numerical simulation
We can illustrate what is going on by three scenarios.  In all of them, r = 0.5
(equivalent to 8% compounded for 5 years) and t1 03 = .  (ie first-year spending of
30% of GDP).
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nd period expenditure reduced
by 1% of GDP, but still
sensitive to the fiscal situation
0.34 0.5
The elasticity of 0.5 chosen for scenarios (B) and (C) is equivalent to assuming
that half of any period 1 surplus is diverted into additional period 2 expenditure.
The expenditure control option chosen for scenario (C) is equivalent to a
spending reduction, in period 2, of 3%.4
The numerical results are as follows:
t1 t2 Deadweight
loss (index)
(A) with balanced budget 0.30 0.35 100.0
(A) with taxes smoothed 0.32 0.32 99.4
(B) with balanced budget 0.30 0.35 100.0
(B) with taxes smoothed 0.326 0.326 103.2
(C) with balanced budget 0.30 0.34 97.3
The following chart sets out the results.  The horizontal axis sets out the first-
period tax rate.  The second-period tax rate is not shown but is calculated from
the budget constraint.  In all scenarios a first-period tax rate of 0.30 implies that
the budget is balanced in each period.  The vertical axis sets out the resulting
deadweight costs, indexed by setting the costs of scenario (A), under a
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Four comments can be made:
*  in the “exogenous expenditure” scenario (A) there are lower costs from tax
smoothing, as compared to balancing the budget, but these are relatively
small, less than 1%;
*  in the “endogenous expenditure” scenario (B) tax smoothing would involve
over 3% higher costs than balancing the budget;5
*  the “endogenous expenditure plus expenditure control” scenario (C) involves
lower costs, compared to (B) of nearly 3%;
*  in both scenarios (B) and (C) deadweight costs would be reduced still further
by lowering the first period tax rate below 30% - ie by going into deficit in the
first period and thereby dragging down second-period expenditure - but that
leads into other issues that are not addressed in this particular model.
Conclusion
This simple model serves to demonstrate that tax smoothing is not optimal tax
policy under all circumstances.  For plausible parameter values, the economic
gains from tax smoothing are quite modest even if expenditure is not influenced
by the short-term fiscal position.  Rather larger are the implications for the costs
of taxation of feedback effects from the budget surplus to expenditure; or of
successful expenditure control.  Put another way, while there are modest
economic gains to be had from tax smoothing, these will only be achieved if the
resulting surpluses, in the initial period, are successfully preserved.